By Solomon Dersso
It is now widely recognised that the multilateral system is in dire crisis. On the one hand, the brief unipolar post-Cold War moment that informed multilateral cooperation for over three decades has ended. We are transitioning to ‘a new global order,’ that of a multipolar order, as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres put it. Describing a key feature of this moment, his New Agenda for Peace stated, ‘power dynamics have become increasingly fragmented as new poles of influence emerge, new economic blocs form and axes of contestation are redefined.’ It also notes a ‘loss of trust between the global north and south.’
On the other hand, the world is facing what some describe as poly-crises – multiple and intersecting crises such as the climate emergency, pandemics, and poverty and inequality that require the collective action of all regions.
These changes and challenges have brought global governance to a major crossroads. Again, as Guterres put it, the multilateral system faces a stark choice: ‘reform or rupture’. According to the Report of the High-level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System, reform is the only choice for much of the world.
An African Perspective on Today’s Global Governance
Global governance has not been truly global in terms of how it is wired and operated. It has been northern-centric.
A major aspect of the reform agenda is rethinking how global governance is organised and operated. Thus far, global governance has not been truly global in terms of how it is wired and operated. It has been northern-centric. If one considers the locus of global governance, many institutions of global governance are located in the global north, mainly in Europe and the US. Geneva, as a hub of UN human rights, the World Trade Organization, and other UN agencies such as the World Health Organization, is one such centre of global governance.
One central area of reform is focused on making global governance institutions representative to address the shortfalls in the current design of global governance. This is articulated in terms of those not-represented and under-represented having seats on the decision-making table in institutions such as the UN Security Council.
The other area of reform concerns the mode of operation of the multilateral system, as reflected in debates over the COVID-19 vaccine and the international response to atrocities in various conflict settings. Leveraging its numbers in the UN General Assembly, which has acquired renewed significance in global policy debates, the global South showed its vision to advance inclusivity when Africa led the world in adopting the UN General Assembly decision to develop a UN convention on tax cooperation.
Beyond the tax convention, African member states of the UN, which constitute 28% of UN member states, together with others in the global south under the G77 plus China put their numbers to good use during the negotiation on the Pact of the Future. Apart from the concessions they secured concerning the reform of global financial institutions, African states played a leading role in defeating Russia’s manoeuvre to derail the consensus on the Pact of the Future at the end of the negotiation process. Speaking on behalf of all African member states of the UN, Congo’s motion not to vote on Russia’s proposed amendment carried the day and secured the adoption of the pact as agreed by consensus.
African countries leveraging their numerical strength find expression in other policy and diplomatic hubs. Geneva is a case in point.
Beyond the reforms highlighted above, of particular interest as an avenue for making global governance effective and truly global is the pursuit of Guterres’ proposal of networked multilateralism, ‘in which the United Nations family, international financial institutions, regional organisations, trading blocs and others work together more closely and more effectively.’
The African Union’s Role in an Era of Networked Multilateralism
According to Guterres, elevating and systematically integrating the role of regional organisations, most notably the African Union (AU), is a critical aspect of networked multilateralism. As he put it in Our Common Agenda, regional bodies ‘are central to sustaining peace and preventing and responding to insecurity’ and ‘fill a critical gap in our global peace and security architecture.’
This also recognises that harnessing the role of regional organisations is a useful vehicle for making global governance truly global, thereby mitigating its north-centric character. This requires that regional organisations, particularly those from the global south, are systematically engaged rather than on an ad hoc basis.
The AU is a leading example of such a regional body. It is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which prides itself on being one of the leading diplomatic hubs in the world. In addition to the AU, Addis is home to 134 embassies and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
Over the past two decades and increasingly during recent years, the AU has become a major platform for shaping and influencing global governance.
Over the past two decades and increasingly during recent years, the AU has become a major platform for shaping and influencing global governance. This is reflected in how it mobilised the collective voice of its member states to advance global public goods. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the AU became an example of effective multilateralism at work at a time when countries, particularly in the global north, were inward-looking. AU’s role in advancing international peace and security is widely acknowledged. The recent ascension of the AU to the G20 membership further reflects the growing role of the AU in the economic and development spheres of global governance.
Linking Addis Ababa and Geneva
It is now widely recognised that global governance cannot remain the same, being geographically and figuratively north-centric. Networked multilateralism involving the leveraging of the role of the AU, using its members’ standing as a major voting bloc in the UN, through close policy exchange and coordination between Addis Ababa and Geneva, holds promise for making global governance truly global, hence fit for the changes and challenges of this new emerging multipolar order.
One pathway for pursuing such networked multilateralism is initiating and maintaining close working relationships between centres of global governance, such as Geneva and Addis Ababa. This can be advanced through, among others, promoting policy dialogue between the two diplomatic hubs on various policy issues of global concern. Some areas of closer cooperation could be:
- Given AU’s role in peace and security, effective collective action on peace and security can be enhanced through closer coordination between Addis Ababa and Geneva. At the very least, this could result in minimising opposition of the Africa Group to initiatives of the UN Human Rights Council to deal with the human rights dimension of conflicts.
- Building on the workstream of conflict and human rights, in 2025, the AU theme of the year is ‘Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations’. As such, it offers another window of opportunity to foster collaboration between the two hubs. Both Guterres and Volker Türk were on record, underscoring the need for making reparatory justice a priority to address the legacy of slavery and colonialism, which continues to impact the daily lives of affected people negatively.
- Third, another area for such close policy coordination between the two hubs is AU’s current effort to operationalise the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is of major interest to the Geneva-based WTO. This will also support action in answering the following questions: What role can the AfCFTA play in advancing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development?
2025 could become the year to test different avenues for exchange between Addis Ababa and Geneva in view of knitting a more strongly networked multilateralism for the future.
Thus, 2025 could become the year to test different avenues for exchange between Addis Ababa and Geneva in view of knitting a more strongly networked multilateralism for the future.
About the Author
Solomon Dersso is the Founding Director of Amani Africa, an independent pan-African policy research, training, and consulting think tank.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Geneva Policy Outlook or its partner organisations.
