By Jussi Hanhimäki
Multilateralism is dead, according to the conventional wisdom following Donald Trump's election. Eight decades of international cooperation are about to reach their end. An era of selfish and unapologetic American isolationism begins in earnest on January 20, 2025.
But hang on a minute. Can the future of multilateralism really hinge upon the election outcome in one country? Is it possible that the entire regime of international institutions and the rich texture of global cooperative mechanisms has been dealt a sudden death blow? Is there no hope for the future of the multilateral order?
Trump 2.0 makes it necessary to embrace Multilateralism 2.0: a multilateralism that does not depend on any one country’s mood swings.
Of course, there is. Trump 2.0 makes it necessary to embrace Multilateralism 2.0: a multilateralism that does not depend on any one country’s mood swings.
A Landslide? Not exactly
Trump’s victory has been heralded as a red wave, a decisive knock-out punch. For the first time since 2004, the Republican candidate won the popular vote, gaining support across almost all ethnic, gender and age groups. Importantly, the Republicans achieved a rare ‘trifecta’: as of January 2025, they control the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. This will undoubtedly make it easier for Trump to push through his agenda over at least the next two years.
But this was not a landslide. While his margin in the Electoral College is a convincing 312 to 226, Trump’s share of the popular vote – at some 77 million – was just below 50 per cent of the total ballots cast. Hardly the kind of ‘landslide’ experienced by the likes of Ronald Reagan (1984), Richard Nixon (1972) or Lyndon Johnson (1964). Trump won mainly because Kamala Harris’s 74.5 million represented a significant decline from Joe Biden’s record-setting 81 million votes in 2020.
With voter turnout down from 65.8 to 63.5 per cent, it is easy to see that, once the dust settles, Democratic strategists will not consider this the end of the road but a failure to energise their supporters. The outcome will be understood as a consequence of the ‘last minute’ change of the Democratic candidate on the one hand and the unfavourable economic climate on the other hand. But American politics will continue, divided as ever.
All said and done, it is impossible to deny that Trump and the Republicans will be firmly in the driver’s seat come January 20, 2025. The short-term impact on America and the wider world will be significant.
Foreign Policy Fears
Given his penchant for unpredictability, it is difficult to assess Trump’s forthcoming impact on US foreign policy. He will certainly push for peace deals in Ukraine and the Middle East (while undoubtedly ignoring forgotten conflicts, such as the one in Sudan). The new administration will play economic hardball by implementing new tariffs specifically directed against China and spearheaded by the Secretary of State designate, Marco Rubio. But the agenda of Make America Great Again (MAGA) is so broad that it can quickly produce domestic inertia and deadlock. Rounding up and deporting illegal immigrants, for example, would gulp up resources and political capital in unimaginable ways. A wholesale attack on the federal bureaucracy could easily backfire.
It is reasonable to assume that the incoming administration will be no fan of multilateral cooperation or global governance. Withdrawals from institutions like the WHO or landmark treaties like the Paris Climate Agreement during Trump’s first term in office will undoubtedly be repeated. NATO allies will be pressed to continue increasing their defence spending if they are to be deemed worthy of America’s protection. The new president will want “deals”, not visionary doctrines. The likelihood that the United States will, under a Trump administration, continue paying the lion’s share of the bills of international organisations without receiving something tangible in return is limited.
While Trump will certainly be different from his predecessor, it is important to note that he is hardly the first president to think about “America First” and discard multilateral institutions. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush all did the same. Like most of his predecessors since the 1960s, Barack Obama demanded more burden-sharing from NATO allies. Over the past eight decades, the United States has practised a kind of multilateralism à la carte. Trump may be the most extreme practitioner of this “doctrine.” But no one can say there was no warning.
The point is this: for multilateralism to survive, it cannot depend on the whims and wishes of a relatively small group of voters in one country.
The point is this: for multilateralism to survive, it cannot depend on the whims and wishes of a relatively small group of voters in one country. The shifts in the electoral margins in states like Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin were significant in determining the outcome of America’s internal political process. But the apparent panic that Trump’s election has caused among the proponents of multilateralism is not only bizarre but should be the final wake-up call.
Towards Multilateralism 2.0
The lesson of Trump’s election should be clear for the future of multilateralism. Reliance on America’s largess – recently detailed in the pages of this publication – cannot be considered a solid foundation of multilateralism or global governance. In the 21st century, International Geneva has been disproportionately financed by the United States (over 26 per cent in 2000-2020). Others must step up their efforts.
It is also clear that a more fundamental transformation is required for multilateralism to thrive rather than just survive. Multilateralism of the future cannot be a predominantly “Western” project. It is not enough for the G-7 countries to cough up the money should the US dramatically reduce its funding. Legitimacy would suffer. The UN and International Geneva would be confronted with a “League of Nations” moment: reduced legitimacy and relevance leading to potential dissolution.
The good news is that it is not too late to act. By now, it should be clear that the idea of an ever-expanding liberal international system built upon the benevolent backing of the United States is far from being realised. However, if a credible and coherent alternative fails to emerge – identifying the BRICS as such appears a questionable proposition in 2024 – the opportunity to build a more inclusive multilateral system is there for the taking. The need to do so is palpable across the global north and south.
For multilateralism to have a future, it must be more inclusive in all possible ways.
This is a big challenge. However, for multilateralism to have a future, it must be more inclusive in all possible ways. It doesn’t necessarily require creating new institutions or organisations – there are plenty of those! This is not a “year-zero” – moment or a call for a revolution. But two things are required: burden-sharing and power-sharing. Neither works well without the other. Expecting stakeholders to spend more by appealing to the better angels of their nature is insufficient.
The election of Donald Trump does not spell an end to multilateralism and global governance. But the panicked reaction to his return to the White House illustrates the obvious. The future of multilateralism cannot depend on political currents in one country, no matter how powerful and rich. It is not the time to give up. It is the moment to start building a more inclusive multilateral system.
About the Author
Jussi Hanhimäki is a Professor of International History and Politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Geneva Policy Outlook or its partner organisations.
